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Abstract We propose a novel upconversion (sum frequency generation) based
quantum-optical setup that can be employed as a receiver (Bob) in practical
quantum key distribution systems. The pump governing the upconversion pro-
cess is produced and utilized inside the physical receiver, making its access or
control unrealistic for an external adversary (Eve). This pump facilitates sev-
eral properties which permit Bob to define and control the modes that can
participate in the quantum measurement. Furthermore, by manipulating and
monitoring the characteristics of the pump pulses, Bob can detect a wide range
of quantum hacking attacks launched by Eve.
Keywords upconversion · quantum hacking · secure quantum key distribu-
tion · quantum frequency conversion · faked-state attacks
1 Introduction
The process of upconversion of light denotes a nonlinear interaction in which
two optical frequencies ω1 and ω2 add together to generate optical radiation
at a third frequency ω3 = ω1 + ω2. It was first observed in lithium niobate
almost half a century ago [1]. A quantum-mechanical treatment [2, 3] of such
frequency conversion processes suggested that the quantum features of one
of the input light beams, usually called ‘signal’, could be preserved during
the nonlinear interaction. This has now been confirmed in numerous exper-
iments [4–8] dealing with frequency upconversion of quantum-optical states,
e.g. entangled states, weak coherent states.
A majority of upconversion experiments aim to convert optical signals in
the near-infrared regime to those in the visible or near-visible regime, where
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highly-efficient and low-noise detectors are easily available. Improvements in
upconversion devices [9–11] and novel approaches, such as the quantum pulse
gate [12] and mode resolving detection enabled by optical arbitrary waveform
generation [13, 14], offer the possibility of high-dimensional communication
with large throughputs. With help of photonic quantum information inter-
faces [15], the prospects of realistic quantum communication networks [16,17]
become more promising.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is certainly one area that can benefit
from the aforementioned advances. Briefly, QKD is a cryptographic method
that facilitates two users Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver) to obtain sym-
metric keys that can then be used for encrypting messages in an information-
theoretically secure manner [18–20]. An adversary Eve attempting to eaves-
drop on the key exchange induces errors that can be detected by Alice and
Bob, thus alerting them and preventing the loss of confidentiality of their
encrypted messages.
In the last decades, QKD has evolved to become the foremost applica-
tion of quantum information technology. Upconversion technology has already
been successfully demonstrated for a variety of QKD systems [7, 8], including
implementations of differential phase shift [21, 22] and measurement-device-
independent (MDI) protocols [23,24]. With features such as low jitter [9] and
inherent polarization sensitivity [25] in addition to the improved detection ef-
ficiency (via Si avalanche photodiodes), upconversion-assisted detectors have
been instrumental in pushing up the secret key rates in practical QKD.
The theoretical security model of QKD, which fundamentally utilizes the
laws of quantum mechanics, offers provably secure key exchange. In practice
however, imperfections and limitations of the physical hardware can open se-
curity loopholes that can be exploited by Eve to attack the QKD system and
obtain knowledge of the key without alerting Alice and Bob [20, 26, 27]. Such
attacks are popularly referred to as quantum hacking [28].
A majority of quantum hacking attempts demonstrated in the last years
involved Eve actively injecting optical pulses into the QKD receiver to exploit
imperfections such as timing related issues in the detection apparatus. The in-
tensity of these pulses (sometimes accompanied with CW power ranging from
less than 1 mW to a few Watts) ranged from that of dim coherent states con-
taining 10−100s of photons to bright pulses having millions of photons [29–36].
In most cases, while the wavelength of Eve’s light was the same as that used by
Alice and Bob, i.e. the telecom wavelength of ∼ 1550 nm, a few eavesdropping
strategies have also been explored at different wavelengths [37–39].
In this paper, we propose an upconversion protected (UCP) receiver that
would fortify practical QKD against a wide range of quantum hacking at-
tacks [40]. The design of the UCP-QKD receiver employs off-the-shelf optical
and optoelectronic components and its operation is simple. The design also
obviates the usual difficulties in trying to analyze (the security of) a QKD
system where every component is evaluated over a huge range of variables
such as wavelength, time, etc. The resulting boost in security improves the
overall performance of a non-cryogenically cooled QKD system since higher
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Fig. 1 (Color online) Basic upconversion device and quantum key distribution receiver
schemes. a) The upconversion takes place inside the nonlinear medium when the pump
and signal modes overlap as prescribed by the phase-matching conditions. The resulting
upconverted/SFG photons inherit the quantum properties of the signal. b) Generic QKD
receiver used by Bob to interferometrically detect quantum states coded in phase and time by
Alice and sent over the quantum channel. AMZI: asymmetric Mach Zehnder interferometer,
PM: phase modulator, D0/1: single photon detectors.
quality semiconductor (Silicon) based single photon detectors are employed.
Therefore, even though we are of the opinion that no cryptographic system
– quantum or classical – can be guaranteed to be unconditionally secure, the
proposed receiver has some desirable properties that enhance the security and
performance of practical QKD. In that sense, our work significantly adds to
the advantages of upconversion technology for practical QKD systems. It also
joins the growing body of countermeasures [41,42] and novel schemes, such as
MDI-QKD [23], conceived in order to heal the Achilles’ heel of QKD [43]: the
(vulnerable) photon detection system, without compromising on performance.
The organization of the paper is as follows: in section 2, we present the
basic principles on which the security provided by the UCP-QKD receiver is
based. We also propose a prototype, explaining its design, operation, and the
implementation of the security features in detail. In section 3 thereafter, we
discuss how the prototyped receiver provides protection against three classes of
attacks. After discussing some practical aspects in section 4 to showcase that
the performance of the UCP-QKD receiver is comparable to state-of-the-art
QKD implementations, we conclude in section 5.
2 Upconversion based QKD receivers
Figure 1a shows the main idea of upconversion. A strong classical ‘pump’ field
at wavelength λpump interacts with a ‘signal’ field at wavelength λsig inside
a χ(2) medium, e.g. a nonlinear waveguide, for the sum frequency generation
(SFG) process. The ‘upconverted/sum’ radiation is at the wavelength λsum =(
1
λpump
+ 1λsig
)−1
and can be shown to preserve the quantum statistics of the
signal field. This is due to the fact that the field operators of the signal and
upconverted modes simply transform into each other (neglecting an overall
phase factor) at an appropriate pump amplitude [2–4].
In order to implement quantum communication systems with upconversion
devices, two useful figures of merit are the efficiency η ≡ ηcηd and the (dark)
noise level in the measurement of the SFG light. Here, ηc essentially indicates
the probability to convert the wavelength of a signal photon from λsig to λsum
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in the nonlinear process, while ηd is the probability to then detect that sin-
gle photon. Note that any practically-useful definition of ηc would include the
waveguide’s non-unity transmission, due to coupling and propagation losses in
the nonlinear medium. The noise includes the intrinsic dark counts of the de-
tector and those due to parasitic nonlinear interactions, such as pump-induced
parametric fluorescence and spontaneous Raman scattering [10,44]. Based on
the typical values of ηc and ηd reported in numerous experiments, achieving
η ∼ 40% at a dark count probability below 10−6 per signal pulse should be
feasible with commercially available detectors [8, 10]. Receivers utilizing up-
conversion technology can therefore surpass the performance of those detecting
photons directly at telecom wavelengths (using non-cryogenic detectors) [45].
2.1 Building blocks
Figure 1b shows a generic time-multiplexed interferometric scheme [46] that
is at the heart of several practical QKD receiver setups (both prepare-and-
measure and entangled-based type) [47–50]. The photon is in a superposition
of the two optical modes, temporally separated by δT , that form the basis of
the qubit space and are used for encoding of the bits “0” and “1”. This quantum
signal, sent over the quantum channel, is received and decoded in an asymmet-
ric Mach Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) that consists of a phase modulator
(PM) and a pair of single photon detectors (D0 and D1). The PM is used for
active basis selection in prepare-and-measure systems and for adjusting the
interferometer to maintain the correlations between pairs of detectors across
the receivers of Alice and Bob in entangled-based systems. Unless mentioned
explicitly, we will be referring to prepare-and-measure systems only.
Integration of the upconversion device shown in Fig. 1a in such a QKD
receiver requires the quantum states received over the quantum channel (as-
sumed to be in control of Eve) to be upconverted by the pump before the
detection stage. Guaranteeing secure operation then implies that the detec-
tion and basis selection apparatus in Bob must be isolated from the external
influences of Eve. More specifically, Eve’s injection from the channel into the
receiver must be restricted in wavelength, time, and power. In the following,
we describe several properties – intrinsic to upconversion devices – that facili-
tate achieving such an objective. The building blocks of the secure UCP-QKD
receiver are thus based on the proper implementation of these properties.
Linear wavelength isolation (LWI)
An upconversion system can be designed so that no optical wavelength lin-
early propagates through the system. In other words, only light generated by
a specified local nonlinear interaction will reach the detection apparatus in
the receiver. Such linear wavelength isolation (LWI) can be achieved simply
by using optical filters, such as a band pass filter (BPF) which lets through
light at wavelengths only inside a certain band. As an instance, although Eve
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can inject as much power as desired at the signal wavelength, without the
SFG interaction, an ideal BPF with central wavelength λsum would block the
injected light from reaching the detectors1. With a carefully-chosen width, the
BPF will also be effective in blocking the harmonics (λsig/n, where n ≥ 2 is an
integer) that may get generated due to poorly phase-matched nonlinearities.
A short pass filter (SPF) that cuts off any light at wavelengths above a speci-
fied wavelength could also be employed, for example to block Eve’s radiation
at λpump from the quantum channel. This prevents Eve from controlling the
nonlinear conversion process herself. Thus, only the frequencies converted via
a specified nonlinear interaction eventually reach the detector while all oth-
ers are suppressed. The detectors are then effectively isolated – in the linear
regime – at all optical wavelengths injected at the input of the receiver. (In
general, by using an appropriate combination of optical filters before and after
the waveguide, any leakage can also be ensured to be negligible). The LWI
property thus heavily curtails the wavelength degree of freedom for Eve.
Optical gating (OG)
In the so-called gated mode operation of a detector, e.g. single photon avalanche
diode (SPAD), an electronically-applied gate raises the diode’s sensitivity to
obtain a measurable response to even single photons in a short temporal win-
dow. In an upconversion device, the nonlinear interaction inside the waveg-
uide can happen only in the presence of the pump pulse. This allows us to
correspondingly define a gate of width τgate where detection events can be
recorded, thereby restricting Eve’s exploitation via the temporal degrees of
freedom. However, the definition of τgate is strongly dependent on the extinc-
tion ratio ER achieved in the production of the pump pulses. In an ideal case
with infinite ER, as depicted in Fig. 2a, it is clear that only signals having
an overlap with the pump pulse would undergo the nonlinear conversion. At
the other extreme, a poor ER (translating into a relatively-large background
level, as shown in Fig. 2b) combined with pulse jitter can force τgate to be
much wider than τpump. This may be exploited by Eve, e.g., through bright
faked states arriving slightly shifted away from the pump peak, as we shall
explain later. The extinction ratio must therefore be large enough to exclude
the possibility of these type of attacks, as depicted by pulse (ii) in Fig. 2c. Fi-
nally, the pump in fact may also act as a gate in the wavelength regime if the
frequency conversion process is phase-matched only for one signal wavelength.
Power limiting and monitoring (PLM)
The amount of optical power entering any QKD receiver can both be lim-
ited and monitored, e.g. by using appropriate combinations of passive and
1 Security concerns arising from nonlinear interactions in the waveguide, especially the
conversion of photons injected by Eve at the signal wavelength after interacting with Bob’s
pump, will be examined in the next subsections.
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Fig. 2 (Color online) Illustration of the power limiting and monitoring (PLM) and optical
gating (OG) properties. (Assume the y-axis with a logarithmic scale). The pump pulse
defines an optical gate where upconversion can happen. a) For an ideal pulse, τgate ≈ τpump
holds. With just the quantum signal, the undepleted (dashed border) and depleted pump
pulses coincide. b) In case of poor extinction however, the pump-pulse specified gate is
either ill-defined or too wide; τgate >> τpump. Eve may then escape the monitoring system
by shifting the strong pulse to upconvert pump background photons. c) Many of Eve’s
attacks in which she replaces the quantum signals with strong pulses, for instance, those
labeled (i) or (ii), can be defeated if the pump pulses can be produced with reasonable
extinction (τgate & τpump) and their depletion can be monitored with high resolution.
active optical components. Recently however, vulnerabilities in such counter-
measures were reported [39]. For an upconversion device, the limiting function
is available in a fundamental sense: the photon flux of the upconverted pulses
is upper bound by the photon flux of the pump pulses. Moreover, a powerful
pulse in the signal mode, as shown by pulse (i) in Fig. 2c, would lead to a
depletion of the pump at the output of the waveguide. To elaborate, let us
denote the peak pump power measured at the input [output] of the waveguide
by Pin [Pout] in the absence of the signal (so that the ratio Pout/Pin indi-
cates the true optical loss through the waveguide). Bob could then monitor
the actual power Pout1 in the presence of a signal. Any noticeable depletion of
the pump would indicate a bright pulse with multiple photons – likely from
Eve’s injection. In a quantitative sense, any unusual fluctuations of the quan-
tity ζ = |1 − Pout1/Pout| could be used for raising alarm and alerting Alice.
Remarkably, this monitoring provides a zero insertion loss method to locate
signatures of potential attacks. The pump parameters and the resolution of
the monitoring system are critical to the success of the power limiting and
monitoring (PLM) property. Note that it is also possible to losslessly monitor
light at the signal wavelength, which further enhances the ability of Bob to
discover unwanted signals injected by Eve.
Nonlinear application of basis choice (NABC)
The SFG signal has a phase that is the combination of both the signal and
pump phases [51]. This opens up the possibility of selecting the basis for the
signal in a nonlinear fashion by randomly modulating the pump phase during
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Fig. 3 (Color online) Schematic of the UCP-QKD receiver. The description and role of the
various filters, such as BPFsig, is given in the text. The AMZI in the pump path is not
shown for the sake of clarity. It will be discussed later; see Fig. 5 for instance. Using a DM,
the pump and signal paths (dotted and solid lines) are overlapped before the waveguide.
Similarly, the SFG (dashed line) is separated from the other waves after the waveguide. The
DMi[o] at the input[output] of the waveguide must be chosen to be highly transmissive at
the signal[sum] wavelength. After passing through another AMZI, the upconverted photons
at λsum are detected by the single photon detectors D0 and D1 (dashed line). Although
not shown, the pump power is monitored before the waveguide as well. AMZI: asymmetric
Mach Zehnder interferometer, B/SPF: Band/Short pass filter, DM: dichroic mirror
the upconversion process. Notably, this kind of basis selection can be per-
formed actively and is essentially loss-less for the signal. A straightforward
security advantage of NABC is that Eve cannot access this nonlinear phase
shift. Furthermore, selecting the basis using the pump alone implies the iso-
lation of Bob’s basis selection apparatus from Eve without using any special
components such as optical isolators. This of course is subject to how well the
pump path can be insulated from Eve. As we shall describe later in detail,
the chances of accessing the secret basis choice remotely from the quantum
channel by means of sending bright pulses and analysing back-reflections can
be made negligible [38, 52]. Additionally Bob can use the NABC property to
detect the presence of injected pulses from Eve, such as faked states.
2.2 System design and operation
The design and operation of a generic upconversion QKD receiver which is
secure against a host of quantum hacking attacks is governed by the above
properties. In a QKD system that implements these properties correctly, Bob
can both define and control the modes that participate in the quantum mea-
surement, which ultimately decides the exchanged key.
Figure 3 shows an exemplary schematic of the UCP-QKD receiver based
on the time-multiplexed interferometric scheme discussed in Fig. 1b. Below we
describe the various components and their roles; unless mentioned otherwise,
we shall always refer to the operation of phase-coded BB84 protocol [18].
For the nonlinear material, we consider a periodically poled lithium nio-
bate (PPLN) waveguide for this example. Pump pulses are generated using
a pulsed laser source at wavelength λpump ≈ 1810 nm; the choice of this long
wavelength pump is guided by decreased noise in the upconversion process [10].
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Every cycle, a pair of pump pulses interact – in the PPLN waveguide – with
a pair of signal pulses (wavelength: λsig ≈ 1530 nm) arriving from the quan-
tum channel. The pulses in a pair are separated by time δT and to ensure a
high efficiency of upconversion, the pump pulse width τpump is chosen so that
it encompasses the signal during the nonlinear interaction (τsig < τpump). To
minimize transmission losses, anti-reflection coatings at λsig[λsum] can mini-
mize the in[out]-coupling losses of the waveguide.
The upconverted modes at λsum ≈ 830 nm are subsequently decoded in
the asymmetric Mach Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) by reversing the delay
δT . It can be seen that the time windows/bins of detection are defined by
the pump pulses: detection events in one of three different output time bins
labeled early, middle, and late are obtained every cycle. The relative phase
of the upconverted modes, which determines the interference outcomes in the
middle time bin, is controlled by the transfer of the phase of the pump pulses
onto signal pulses during upconversion. Therefore the AMZI just before the
detectors includes only a time delay. The outcomes are recorded via the detec-
tion clicks of Si-based single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) that exhibit a
high quantum efficiency around λsum and operate in the free-running mode.
Implementation of LWI
The coiled fiber at the entrance of the QKD receiver shown in Fig. 3 essentially
serves as a short pass filter (SPF)2. The radius of the coil is chosen such that
the SPF cutoff wavelength is . 1800 nm. This would have a minimal impact
on the signal photons at λsig ≈ 1530 nm and simultaneously prevent Eve from
injecting her own pump at long(er) wavelengths. Together with the PPLN
waveguide, featuring a transparency window that starts around 350 nm, the
pertinent wavelength range for any attack could then be roughly narrowed
down to 300− 1850 nm.
Using a dichroic mirror (DM) before/after the PPLN (see Fig. 3) facilitates
in combining/separating the pump from the signal/upconverted photons. De-
pending on the dichroic filter type, the practical implementation may work in
the reflecting or transmitting mode [53,54]. Note that if an all-fiber-integrated
assembly is employed [55, 56], wavelength division multiplexers can be used
instead of the dichroic mirrors. The short pass filter SPFsig after the waveg-
uide cuts off the infrared pump and signal wavelengths while allowing the
upconverted photons to pass through to the detectors. Together with the two
band pass filters BPFsig and BPFsum, centered at λsig and λsum, respectively,
it plays an essential role in implementing LWI in the receiver. In other words,
this assembly ensures that light at all wavelengths injected from the quantum
channel are suppressed before the SPDs except for the photons upconverted
from λsig to λsum by Bob’s pump pulses.
Figure 4 sums up the contribution of the different optical elements that
realizes LWI in the receiver. Several commercial DMs, SPFs, and BPFs that can
2 Alternatively, an appropriate filter can be used, but a coiled fiber offers a lower loss and
cost-effective solution.
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Fig. 4 (Color online) Linear wavelength isolation in the QKD receiver shown in Fig. 3. Any
wavelength – chosen by Eve to attack – corresponds to a horizontal line in this chart. It is
possible to engineer that any wavelength encounters heavy losses (> 60 dB) before reaching
the SPDs. The gradient values for the different components here are illustrative. The widths
∆sig and ∆sum of the band pass filters BPFsig and BPFsum centered at λsig and λsum are
not more than a few tens of nm; this choice does not affect the overall receiver efficiency.
be used here are available in both free-space and fiber-optic versions [57–59].
Also, two filters of the same kind could be cascaded to provide even higher
optical density in the 300− 1850 nm wavelength range. In fact, one could also
get rid of the SPFs and just use a series of BPFsig [BPFsum] before [after] the
waveguide – provided sufficient isolation in the aforementioned wavelength
range (with the exception of λsig and λsum) is achievable.
It is very important that the net filtering greatly attenuate an input at the
phase-matched pump wavelength. This ensures that Eve cannot inject a large
pump – together with signal of appropriate power level – that allows her to
have control over the nonlinear interaction and circumvent the power limit-
ing and LWI properties of the system. Given the large wavelength separation
between the pump and signal (λpump − λsig ∼ 300 nm), ultra-high pump at-
tenuation with low signal loss should be possible. We estimate that ∼ 80 dB of
isolation (which is quite easy to obtain because of the dichroic mirror) until the
waveguide at λpump would be sufficient. This would ensure that the power of
Eve’s injected pump is < 100 nW inside the waveguide, and the corresponding
upconverted light is too dim to be useful for any known attacks3.
Implementation of PLM and OG
To implement PLM, the residual pump (after the nonlinear interaction) is
diverted to a monitoring stage where its depletion is recorded. A high res-
olution monitoring system would catch classical optical pulses injected by
3 We assume that the optical fibers in front of the receiver would readily fuse, disconnect-
ing the receiver from the quantum channel, for & 10 W average input powers [42].
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Fig. 5 (Color online) Monitoring of the pump & signal and nonlinear phase transfer between
them. Relative power measurements before and after the waveguide by pump monitors (in)
and (out), respectively, can indicate even minor depletions. The depleted signal (solid red
line after prism) can be optionally monitored with a suitably-sensitive detector that would
register detection events during attacks. The relative phase modulated on the pump is
transferred onto the signal during the nonlinear interaction. A prerequisite to implementing
such basis selection is the calibration of the modulation voltages at λpump to ensure correct
measurement of the QKD protocol alphabet with the upconverted photons.
Eve in the signal mode, as was shown in Fig. 2c. If ζmin denotes the mini-
mum resolution of the monitoring system and Pout denotes the pump peak
power at the output of the waveguide in normal circumstances, peak pow-
ers as low as ζminPoutλpumpτpump/λsigτsig of pulses substituted by Eve in the
signal mode could be caught. Taking realistic pump and signal parameters
of Pout = 100 mW, τpump = 100 ps and τsig = 80 ps, and ζmin = 0.1%, Eve’s
pulses with peak powers above 150µW [29,31,32,60] would result in alarm and
foil the attack. Such high resolution monitoring can be performed by recording
the pump power both before and after the waveguide, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
The pulse monitoring could actually be taken one step further by also mon-
itoring light at the signal wavelength. This could be done by adding a prism
in the pump monitoring arm, as shown in Fig. 5. Nothing would be registered
on this monitor in case of a legitimate quantum signal, however, Eve’s large
injections around λsig would get caught due to insufficient depletion. Notably,
this is again a loss-less method to check for attacks.
In order to implement OG securely, we believe ER values of at least −30 dB
would be required. Consider a situation similar to the one depicted in Fig. 2c
with τgate ∼ 2τpump. Such a large gate width may be practically necessary to
minimize the effect of jitter, etc. Reusing the numerical values of the example
in the previous paragraph, a bright faked state timed to arrive just after the
pump-pulse peak (like pulse (ii) in the figure, but just inside τgate) avails at
the most Pout/1000 ≈ 100µW of power from the pump. Even assuming full
upconversion, or ηc = 100%, the peak power of the pulses generated at λsum
and hitting Bob’s SPDs cannot exceed λsig/λsum × 100 ≈ 185µW, which is
again well below the typical peak powers used in faked-state attacks4.
4 In fact, using the formula for conversion efficiency [2, 3], the actual ηc < 1% and with
propagation losses around 3 dB, the peak power on the detectors would be < 1µW.
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To reduce even further the chances of security breach from Eve’s attack
pulses outside the pump pulse, one can also randomly modulate the phase
modulator (PM) between pump pulses. This would defeat the detector control
strategy due to randomization of the detection outcomes in D0 and D1. In
that sense, the impact of a poor ER can also be mitigated.
Implementation of NABC
Figure 5 shows a simple scheme that demonstrates the preparation of the
pump pulses by using an AMZI in the pump arm; also see Fig. 3. This scheme
also illustrates the nonlinear application of basis choice (NABC), some aspects
of which have already been covered. In particular, using a dichroic mirror to
combine the pump and signal can be quite effective in isolating the pump path
from the quantum channel. As explained previously, this successfully prevents
Eve from obtaining back-reflections, e.g. via Trojan-horse attacks [38, 39, 52],
that may divulge the secret basis choice.
With a simple modification in the setup of Fig. 5, Bob can also detect the
presence of Eve’s faked states, which adds to the already-available security
features due to PLM. For this, Bob creates a single pump pulse instead of a
pair. Such a task can be accomplished by using an intensity modulator in one
of the arms of the pump AMZI. The upconversion now takes place for only
one of the two signal modes resulting in only two instead of three time bins.
Moreover, the interference in the middle bin is stamped out. Due to this, Eve
cannot control the detection outcomes using faked states. This technique can
be used to randomly sample the quantum channel for faked state injection.
3 Protection against various quantum hacking attacks
In the following, we discuss in detail how the generic QKD receiver can foil
three specific categories of attacks. At the end of this section, we also explain
the advantages of using free-running single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs)
over their gated counterparts for the purpose of upconverted signal detection.
3.1 Detector control attacks
The basic idea of detector control attacks is to exploit certain imperfections
of the detection subsystem to control the measurement outcomes. In the last
decade, numerous such attacks have been demonstrated on a variety of practi-
cal QKD receivers [29–31,33–35,60,61]. In the case of the UCP-QKD receiver
however, the optical gating (OG) and linear wavelength isolation (LWI) prop-
erties ensure that detection events can take place only in the presence of a
pump pulse. As explained in the previous section, this is subject to a rea-
sonable extinction of the pump pulses. Assuming the pump is well isolated
from Eve’s control, temporally advancing or delaying of Alice’s states in the
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quantum channel [61] or timing dim coherent faked states to prevent incor-
rect detection events [33] would necessarily result in a misalignment w.r.t.
the pump, causing a severe reduction of the detection click rate. Note that the
pump-defined temporal detection window creates a common gate for all subse-
quent detectors and monitors. Attacks that use blinding light with faked-state
pulses [30,31,60] that have a temporal overlap with the pump pulse would be
caught as they would lead to an observable depletion of the pump pulse; see
Fig. 2c as an example.
Using a single pump pulse instead of pulse pairs at random sample times,
as mentioned previously in the implementation of NABC, can also be used
to catch detector control attacks. With this measure, in case of normal input
(i.e., quantum signals from Alice), the detections in D0 and D1 should no
longer bear any relation with the pump phase modulation. In other words,
the detections become totally random. Eve’s multiphoton states – replacing
the quantum signals during detector control attacks – would likewise become
useless. Even more, based on the detection statistics collected during such
checks, Bob would be able to observe a divergent pattern, such as an increased
double click rate, thus learning about Eve’s attack.
3.2 Wavelength-dependent behavior/Trojan-horse like attacks
Thanks to the various properties of the UCP-QKD receiver, vulnerabilities
arising due to the wavelength-dependent behavior of optical components such
as fiber couplers and isolators [37, 39] can be easily prevented. Eve cannot
successfully launch an intercept and resend attack at two different wavelengths
to exploit the starkly-different splitting ratios of a fiber coupler [37] since
the SPDs are well-isolated from her injected pulses. Traditional Trojan-horse
attacks [38,52,62], where Eve sends in a bright pulse into the QKD system and
measures back-reflections that may reveal information about the basis choice,
can also be thwarted5. There are multiple reasons that Eve cannot ascertain
the secret basis choice of Bob: the phase of the pump is nonlinearly transferred
onto the signal pulses and probing at λpump is prevented via LWI. The only
wavelength not protected by LWI is the signal wavelength, and this wavelength
is not impacted by the pump phase.
In general, mechanisms that involve photons carrying useful information
inadvertently leaking out of the QKD system without requiring any active
injection from Eve are also possible. For instance, in what may be coined as
self Trojan-horse attack, pump photons carrying information about the state
of the PM may incur a back-reflection, say from the waveguide interface, and
due to finite extinction/crosstalk of the DM/WDM (used as such for combining
the signal and pump; see Fig. 3), some photons may eventually trickle out of
5 In Fig. 3, the basis choice is implemented by a phase modulator (PM) in the pump
arm. An optical path that allows reflection(s), carrying an imprint of the modulation, to
propagate out of the system at least physically exists if we assume a fiber-optical wavelength
division multiplexer (WDM) instead of the free-space dichroic mirror (DM).
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the receiver into the hands of Eve. Alternatively, the flash induced in the single
photon avalanche diode during breakdown may reveal information about the
clicked detector to an eavesdropper collecting such photons on the quantum
channel [63]. The vulnerabilities due to such mechanisms can also be drastically
reduced by a sufficiently-large LWI.
3.3 Laser damage attack
Attacks aiming to permanently damaging detectors by impinging extremely
high CW power [36] are greatly mitigated by the UCP-QKD receiver. We ex-
pect that the maximum power injection levels cannot exceed a few Watts due
to the fiber fuse effect. Assuming the ability to withstand ≤ 10 W input optical
power, a large attenuation of 80 dB at λpump (as discussed in the previous sec-
tion) would relegate the power reaching the detectors to a few µWs, which can
be considered a safe operating condition with respect to permanent damage.
Eve is confined to attack with high powers around λsig due to the LWI
property. But even at this wavelength, the PLM property severely restricts the
amount of power that eventually reaches the SPDs. To explain via a numerical
example, assume the pump with a peak power Pout ≈ 100 mW and a 10% duty
cycle. Even with a unity efficiency conversion of the signal, the average power
of the upconverted beam would still be . 20 mW (factor of 2 from the fact that
λsum ≈ 2λpump). This power is more than an order of magnitude below what
Eve requires to inflict damage on Bob’s detectors [36]. Furthermore, through
the monitoring system at the exit of the waveguide; see Fig. 5, Bob would
observe not only a high depletion of the pump pulses but also a large response
at the signal wavelength. This would clearly result in raising an alarm.
3.4 Choice of single photon detectors
The choice of single photon detectors can also impact the security of the QKD
system against a variety of hacking attacks. As mentioned earlier, we consider
Si-based single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) that are actively quenched,
i.e. operate in the free-running or ‘ungated’ mode. This choice is firstly reason-
able because gated mode does not provide any significant improvement in the
noise performance of Si-based single photon detectors, unlike InGaAs based
SPADs that generally suffer from high thermal dark counts and afterpulsing if
left ungated. Secondly, the lack of a detection gate already reduces the chances
of many types of detector control attacks. For instance, the (temporal) detec-
tion efficiency mismatch loophole [64] that may be exploited via the time-shift
attack [61] or the faked-state attack [33] can be avoided. This feature also nat-
urally precludes Eve from gaining remote access to the SPADs by attacking
after the gate [29], or at the falling edge of the electrical gate6 [34]. Although
6 The detector is in linear mode after the gate and displays superlinear characteristics at
the falling edge, i.e. when it is making a transition from the Geiger mode to the linear mode.
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Parameter name and description Symbol Value range (units)
Temporal width, signal pulse τsig 80− 100 ps
Temporal width, pump pulse τpump 100− 120 ps
System repetition rate fR 1.0 GHz
Center wavelength, signal λsig 1550± 20 nm
Center wavelength, pump λpump 1830± 20 nm
Center wavelength, sum λsum 830± 10 nm
Bandwidth, signal BPF ∆sig 10− 20 nm
Bandwidth, sum frequency BPF ∆sum 2− 5 nm
Temporal separation between time
bins corresponding to bits “0” and “1”
δT 300− 400 ps
Table 1 Values of various significant parameters in the upconversion based quantum key
distribution (QKD) receiver shown in Fig. 3.
a UCP-QKD receiver equipped with gated SPADs may resist most attacks,
the security constraints are bound to be tighter. Hence, we recommend the
use of free-running SPADs.
4 Overall performance and practical aspects
In the previous sections, we have described how the UCP-QKD receiver can
defeat a plethora of quantum hacking attacks. Table 1 lists the range of values
of different parameters that have been already introduced in the last pages.
This represents one possible design of the system. Note that many design
alternatives are possible, such as using 2 micron pump light to reduce noise
even further, provided they are engineered to preserve the basic properties of
a UCP-QKD receiver, described in subsection 2.1.
The upconversion process can be highly efficient: values of ηc > 80% for the
conversion efficiency, which includes the optical transmission and the in- and
out- coupling losses through the waveguide, are viable [10]. High-performance
detectors exhibiting large quantum efficiencies ηd ≈ 80% at the upconverted
wavelengths, low intrinsic noise characteristics D ≈ 10 − 100 cps, and fast
counting rates R & 10 Mcps are commercially available. The probability of
successfully upconverting and detecting a quantum signal pulse at λsig is then
given by the overall efficiency ηov = ηcηdηf ; values in the range of 30 − 40%
can be envisaged easily. Here ηf ≈ 50% denotes the cumulative transmission
of the various optical filters used for implementing LWI; see Fig. 3.
Based on these numbers, sifted key rates of the order of 100 Kbps for ∼
100 km channel lengths would be feasible with the first generation receivers.
Also, by adopting measures such as long wavelength pump and strict filtering,
the overall noise in the upconversion process can also be kept sufficiently low;
assuming Dov ≤ 1 Kcps, the contribution to the quantum bit error rate would
be under 1%. We note that for ease of implementation one can also use a
pump source very close to the signal (e.g. 10 nm [14]), where high-quality
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modulators and amplifiers are readily available. However, this would increase
noise and may make the implementation of LWI more difficult.
As mentioned in the introduction, UCP-QKD is similar to MDI-QKD in
the sense that both address vulnerabilities in the photon detection apparatus
of realistic QKD implementations. Also, both offer realistic implementations
with off-the-shelf components; most significantly, both allow the transmitter to
use weak coherent states, typically realized by attenuated laser pulses, which
are the most practical quantum signals for QKD. While only MDI-QKD claims
a rigorous security proof against quantum hacking of the detectors, UCP-QKD
does not share some of MDI-QKD’s stringent requirements that make the lat-
ter more difficult to implement and lower the resulting key rate. For instance
MDI-QKD implementations require indistinguishability of the weak coherent
states generated by both Alice and Bob and they also intrinsically suffer from
a reduced key rate due to ‘low gain’ of the single photon states [24]. Thus,
although the two methods have fundamental differences which make a direct
comparison difficult, roughly speaking, while MDI-QKD offers a more secure
but lower performing system, the goal of UCP-QKD is improved security with-
out a substantial reduction in performance or practicality.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have detailed the design and operation of a novel upconver-
sion protected (UCP) receiver for the purpose of doing secure quantum key
distribution (QKD). We have specifically shown how Bob can use this UCP-
QKD receiver to protect himself against various quantum hacking attacks,
launched by an eavesdropper Eve from the quantum channel. This is possible
because of properties intrinsic to the upconversion process that can restrict the
degrees of freedom which Eve might have otherwise exploited to take advan-
tage of the imperfections of the detection apparatus. Eve’s manipulations are
thus either rendered futile or can be suitably monitored to raise alarms and
abort the QKD protocol. The security features can even be combined with
other known measures to counter attacks, such as the real time monitoring
of the detector parameters [41]. Such UCP-QKD receivers therefore greatly
enhance the security of practical QKD systems. With rapid advances in inte-
grated photonic technologies, on-chip implementations of the waveguide and
filtering system can minimize the optical losses even further, thereby increasing
the key rates obtainable with such receivers.
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